The strongest objections to our position

A credible case against prioritising new reactors must address the best evidence on the other side. Each answer states what is true, what it does not decide and what would change our assessment.

Evidence reviewed
Translation status
Master text
Revision
2026-07-17.2
01

Nuclear power really is low carbon

What is true

Yes. The IPCC identifies nuclear as a scalable low-carbon source. Lifecycle emissions are in the same low range as wind and far below gas or coal.

What it does not decide

That is a strong case against fossil generation, but it does not settle the choice among low-carbon options. Construction time, finance and cumulative emissions avoided by the deadline also matter.

What would change our assessment

We would prioritise new reactors where a transparent regional comparison shows that they avoid more emissions per euro by the target date at the same reliability.

Sources (2)
  1. IPCC AR6 WGIII, Chapter 6: Energy Systems
  2. RTE: French electricity greenhouse-gas emissions, 2025
02

Nuclear helps when wind and solar output are low

What is true

Reactors generate independently of wind and sunlight. Dispatchable, around-the-clock low-carbon power can be valuable in a weather-dependent system.

What it does not decide

Reactors also have planned and unexpected outages. Low-wind periods are a system problem that grids, storage, flexible demand, hydro and other firm clean resources can address in different combinations.

What would change our assessment

Nuclear gains weight if hourly, multi-weather-year models show that it meets the same reliability more cheaply and robustly after all backup and network costs are counted.

Sources (3)
  1. IEA: The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy, executive summary
  2. IPCC AR6 WGIII, Chapter 6: Energy Systems
  3. RTE: French electricity generation and nuclear availability, 2025
03

France, Sweden and Ontario show that nuclear works

What is true

They show that nuclear can form a large part of a reliable, very low-carbon electricity system. Dismissing those records would be wrong.

What it does not decide

These systems were built over decades and also use hydro, renewables, networks and trade. Their current performance does not establish today's cost or delivery time for a new reactor.

What would change our assessment

The stronger case would be a current programme reproducing those results under transparent European costs, schedules and risk allocation.

Sources (3)
  1. RTE: French Annual Electricity Review 2025, key findings
  2. Government of Canada: clean electricity in Ontario
  3. Swedish Energy Agency: electricity generation in 2024
04

Korea, China and the UAE build more successfully

What is true

Recent Korean and Chinese units demonstrate construction in roughly five to six years, while the UAE completed a four-unit standardised programme. Nuclear does not always take fifteen years.

What it does not decide

Dates do not prove cost control. Mature designs, repeat orders, experienced suppliers, stable regulation and state-backed finance may not transfer to a new market.

What would change our assessment

A licensed repeat design, an experienced delivery team and independently reviewed cost, schedule and risk allocation would make a proposal much stronger.

Sources (4)
  1. IPCC AR6 WGIII, Chapter 6: Energy Systems
  2. IAEA PRIS: Shin-Kori 1 reactor record
  3. IAEA PRIS: Fuqing 5 reactor record
  4. IAEA country nuclear-power profile: United Arab Emirates
05

Nuclear uses little land

What is true

Nuclear performs well on land occupation and bulk material use per unit of electricity.

What it does not decide

Comparisons must use the same boundary. Most land within a wind project is not physically occupied, rooftop solar adds little land use, and nuclear also has mining, cooling and waste footprints.

What would change our assessment

Nuclear gains value where land or biodiversity is the binding constraint and co-use, rooftops, offshore generation and networks cannot resolve it.

Sources (3)
  1. IPCC AR6 WGIII, Chapter 6: Energy Systems
  2. US Department of Energy: nuclear energy and land use
  3. NREL: wind deployment and land use
06

Germany closed nuclear plants while still burning coal

What is true

Germany removed available low-carbon generation before ending coal. Where continued reactor output would have displaced fossil generation, emissions would have been lower. Safe lifetime extensions can also be inexpensive.

What it does not decide

That does not establish the case for new construction. German coal generation and emissions fell in 2023, so the observed record also does not support a simple claim that the exit automatically increased coal use.

What would change our assessment

We support assessing existing plants separately and extending operation where the regulator approves it, the cost beats an equivalent alternative and fossil generation is demonstrably displaced.

Sources (3)
  1. IEA and OECD-NEA: Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 2020
  2. German Federal Network Agency: electricity market in 2023
  3. German Environment Agency: final emissions data for 2023
07

SMRs could solve the cost and schedule problem

What is true

Smaller projects, factory production and repeat modules could reduce individual financing exposure and construction risk. Technical and regulatory progress is real.

What it does not decide

A plausible design is not a demonstrated market price. Savings require successful first projects, many repeat orders, working supply chains and enough learning to offset lost economies of scale.

What would change our assessment

Several standardised plants delivered for different customers at independently verified costs, schedules and operating performance would materially change our view.

Sources (3)
  1. IEA: The Path to a New Era for Nuclear Energy, executive summary
  2. OECD-NEA: Small Modular Reactor Dashboard
  3. IPCC AR6 WGIII, Chapter 6: Energy Systems